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WHAT CONSTITUTES INTENT TO DEDICATE
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
History and Scope
Closely akin to dedication in principle, and appearing much earlier
in the common law, is the doctrine of customary rights. The nature
of these rights is pointed out in the New York case of Post v. Pear-
sail:1
A custom can exist only in favor of a community of a town,
village or hamlet; and because the claimants have been in im-
memorial use of the right claimed, the legal presumption in Eng-
land is, that these customs were originally based upon and
created by Act of Parliament; although not by that body as it
is now constituted.
Even more simply stated, a custom is a mere local usage, not
belonging to any particular person, but belonging to the community
rather than its individuals.2 Blackstone states that customary rights
arose out of the necessities of the public and are based on the fact
that from time immemorial certain uses were permitted.3 It was
on this theory of customary rights that ways were acquired by the
public (or rather by a local public) at early common law.4
When the doctrine of customary rights became incapable of effec-
tive operation because of modem conditions, the English courts
seized upon a new doctrine which they called dedication.5 This doc-
trine was first recognized in the 1713 case of Queen v. Inhabitants
of Hornsey:
6
If a vill be erected, and a way laid out to it, if there be no
other way but that to the vill, it is not material quo animo it was
laid out, it shall be deemed a public way.
The landmark case, the first to call the doctrine dedication, was Lade
v. Shepherd,7 decided in 1735. While dedication was named and
started into the stream of the common law by this case, the doctrine
1. 22 WEND. 425 (N. Y. 1839).
2. 1 THo PsoN, RAM, PROPaRTY § 414 (2d ed. 1939).
3. 2 Br,. Com. § 33.
4. Chaplin, Dedication in Its Relation to Trust Legislation, 16 HARv. L.
Rav. 330 (1903).
5. Id. at 333.
6. 10 Mod. 151, 88 Eng. Rep. 670 (Q. B. 1713).
7. 2 Strange 1004, 93 Eng. Rep. 997 (K. B. 1735).
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did not come prominently into view until the nineteenth century.
8
While it is an important part of the law of England, the doctrine
of customary rights has never received much recognition in the United
States. This is mainly due to the fact that customary rights are of
much less importance in a new society than in an ancient state.
9 At
least one American jurisdiction, New Hampshire, does recognize
customary rights, however.' 0 Dedication, unlike customary rights,
has developed rapidly in America, and is now a much broader field of
law here than in England."
In 1821, less than a hundred years after the landmark case of
Lade v. Shepherd, the South Carolina court by way of dicta recog-
nized the doctrine of dedication in the case of Witter v. Harvey.'
2
Since the almost passing reference to the doctrine in this case, the
law on this subject has developed quite broadly in this state.
Leading text-writers point out the difference in common-law dedi-
cation and statutory dedication as being that the former works as
an estoppel in pais, while the latter works by way of grant.'8 Thomp-
son defines a common-law dedication as the setting aside of land
for public use, which must be done with the intent of the owner
clearly indicated by his words or acts, and an acceptance by the public
of the dedication. 14 A common-law dedication leaves the legal title
in the owner, but makes such legal title subject to the public ease-
ment created. 15 South Carolina cases bear out this last statement.' 6
A statutory dedication is a dedication effected by recording a plat
in substantial compliance with the statute authorizing it.17 The
8. Chaplin, supra note 4, at 333.
9. Am. AND ENGLISH ENcYc. or LAw 373 (2d ed. 1904). It should be
pointed out that while the South Carolina court sometimes speaks of customary
rights, they are not public property rights as are discussed here. See Walker
v. Chichester, 2 Brev. 67 (S. C. 1806) and Knox v. Artman, 3 Rich. 283 (S. C.
1832) in which an ancient custom of the city of Charleston requiring joint land
owners to contribute equally to partition fences was upheld.
10. Knowles v. Dow, 22 N. H. 387 (1851); Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N. H. 524
(1845). As late as 1935 in Gillies v. Orienta Beach Club, t59 Misc. 675, 289
N. Y. S. 733 (1935), the doctrine of customary rights in the public was argued.
The court rejected the doctrine on the basis of the different social conditions
which exists in America today and the feudalism which gave rise to the doc-
trine. Also the court pointed out that the justification for the doctrine was
the destruction of supposed grants, which theory could find no support in a new
state where records and statutes are filed and kept.
11. Chaplin, supra note 4, at 333.
12. 1 McCord 67, 10 Am. Dec. 650 (S. C. 1821).
13. 11 McQUILLN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33.03 (3rd ed. 1950); 2
TnompsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 482.
14. 2 Tomoso, op. cit. szpra note 2, § 482.
15. 11 McQuim.iN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 33.03.
16. Leppard v. Central Carolina Telephone Co., 205 S. C. 1, 30 S. E. 2d 755
(1944) ; Charleston Rice Milling Co. v. Bennett & Co., 18 S. C. 254 (1882).
17. 2 THompsox, op. cit. supra note 2, § 482.
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title acquired under a statutory dedication depends on the particular
statute, so that while the majority rule is that a fee passes, where
the statute provides otherwise, a lesser interest may pass.' 8
Since South Carolina has no provision for statutory dedication,
the scope of this note will be devoted to what constitutes an intent to
dedicate under a common-law dedication.
Intent to Dedicate
Dedication can only be made by the owner of a fee in the land
or by another with the owner's consent.19 Stated in the negative,
a person cannot dedicate land to the public unless he has capacity
to make a grant.2 0 A dedication must be made for the use of the
public at large, and cannot be for private uses or limited to such
persons as the owner may desire.
2 1
The main essential of a dedication is the intent of the owner to
dedicate, and unless such intent is found from the facts in a given
ease, no dedication can exist.2 2 The unequivocal statement that an
intent must always be present is not wholly correct, in that a common-
law dedication often rests on the conduct of the land owner, relied on
by the public to their injury so as to constitute an estoppel in pais
against the owner, even though there was never in the mind of the
owner any actual intent to dedicate; in brief, the intent may be actual
or implied.2 If the intent is actual and expressed, such expression
may be oral or in writing.2 4 In the recent case of Shia v. Pender-
grass,2 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Fishburne, said:
It must be borne in mind that title to real estate, or any in-
terest therein, is ordinarily passed by deed or will, and, while
one may lose his land without an actual conveyance of the same,
the acts and conduct on his part, and upon the part of the one
18. 11 McQuiLuN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 33.69.
19. Safety Building & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S. C. 542, 128 S. E. 724 (1925);
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Town of Fairfax, 80 S. C. 414, 61 S. R. 950 (1908).
20. Grady v. City of Greenville, 129 S. C. 89, 123 S. E. 494 (1924).
21. Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S. C. 342, 72 S. E. 2d 699 (1952) : Safety Build-
ing & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S. C. 542, 128 S. E. 724 (1925). There are some
exceptions to the statement that a dedication cannot be for private uses or
limited to such persons as the owner may desire, an exception being a dedication
of a graveyard. See Ex parte McCall, 68 S. C. 489 (1903) and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Cothran in Frost v. Columbia Clay Co., 130 S. C. 72, 124
S. E. 767 (1923).
22. 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1079 (5th ed. 1911).
23. 11 McQUIILIN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 33.29.
24. 2 TnompsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 486.
25. 222 S. C. 342, 72 S. E. 2d 699 (1952).
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claiming to have acquired such title in such way, must be so
unequivocal and positive as to leave little doubt that it was
the intention of the owner to dedicate the same to public use.
By this we do not mean that the expression of such an intent
upon the owner's part need be proven, but his acts and conduct
in regard to the property must be of such character that the
public, dealing with him upon the strength of such conduct,
could not but believe that his intention was to vest an easement
therein in the public.
In some jurisdictions the general rule in civil law cases requiring
only a preponderance of evidence to establish a disputed fact applies
where the fact of a dedication is at stake.26 But in South Carolina
an intent to dedicate must be clearly and unequivocally manifested,2 7
and must be shown by dear, cogent, and convincing evidence.2 8
Seven ways by which an intent may be shown are:29 (1) by a
plat executed and recorded as provided by statute so as to constitute
a statutory dedication, (2) by a plat executed and filed by the owner
of property which is not sufficient as a statutory dedication, but is
evidence of an intent to dedicate, (3) by an owner platting his land
and selling lots pursuant to the plat, (4) by recitals in a deed which
recognize the rights of the public, (5) by the owner's oral declara-
tions, (6) by affirmative acts on the part of the owner, (7) by the
owner's acquiescence in the public's use of his property for a public
purpose; this intent need not be actual.
Since there is no provision for statutory dedication in South Caro-
lina, the first two methods of showing intent listed above cannot
arise in this state.
The third method, intent being shown by the owner platting his
land and then selling lots pursuant to this plat, gives rise to such
problems as to necessitate a separate section of this note, and will
be dealt with later.
The fourth way of showing intent, by recitals in a deed recogniz-
ing the rights of the public, has been touched on in South Carolina
in the case of Glenn v. Woodworth.30 In this case a deed was given
to the city of Spartanburg of a tract of land, partly in and partly
out of the city, for park purposes, with a provision that: "the City
26. Spencer v. Peterson, 41 Ore. 257, 68 P. 519 (1902).
27. Antonakas v. Chamber of Commerce, 130 S. C. 215, 126 S. E. 35 (1924).
28. Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Town of Fairfax, 80 S. C. 414, 61 S. E. 950
(1908).
29. 11 McQuILLiN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 33.30.
30. 197 S. C. 56, 14 S. E. 2d 555 (1941).
1953]
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of Spartanburg is to improve all roads and streets located within
the city limits on the said tract of land by grading and top-soiling,
and I [the grantor] am to improve roads and streets lying outside
of the city limits on the said tract of land." The court held this to
be a dedication of the roads and streets outside the city. While the
court gave no reasonr Qr authority for so holding, it would appear
that it was because the deed recognized the rights of the public.
The fifth and sixth methods laid down above for determining in-
tent to dedicate, namely by oral declarations and affirmative acts
respectively, are so widely known and accepted as to require no fur-
ther comment. The seventh method laid down above, whereby an
intent to dedicate may be shown by the public's use, is extensive
enough to require a separate section of this note and will be dealt
with later.3 1
Sale with Reference to a Plat
When a land owner plats his land into lots and streets and then
sells lots in reference to the plat, two main questions arise. The
first of these is whether the sale in reference to the plat constitutes
a dedication of the streets and alleys on the plat to the public or
merely shows an intent to dedicate; the second question involves
the rights of the purchasers to the streets on the plat which were
referred to and relied upon when the sale took place.
It is a general rule that if an owner of a tract of land plats it,
and thereafter sells lots with reference to the plat, he is regarded
as having dedicated the streets and alleys which appear on the plat
to the public.32 Some cases hold, however, that the making of a
plat and the sale of lots in reference thereto are merely evidence of
an intent to dedicate, which offer or intent must be acted upon or
accepted like any other common law dedication in order to create
any rights in the public.0 3 This latter view is the basis of early
South Carolina cases 34 and recent cases, 35 but for a period the
South Carolina court adopted the general rule stated above.8 6
31. It has been pointed out on the negative side in Shia v. Pendergrass, 222
S. C. 342, 72 S. E. 2d 699 (1952) that the fact that a person who disclaims an
intent to dedicate, continued to pay taxes after the time the supposed dedication
took place, was not of itself, considered very strong evidence of an intent not
to dedicate, yet, it is of some value as evidence tending to negate an intent.
32. 4 TIFrANY, Ri.L PaoMMY, § 1103 (3rd ed. 1939).
33. 3 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 22, § 1090.
34. State v. Carver, 5 Strob. 217 (S. C. 1850) ; Town Council of Aiken v.
Lythgoe, 7 Rich. 435 (S. C. 1854).
35. Outlaw et al. v. Moise, 222 S. C. 24, 71 S. E. 2d 509 (1952) ; Cason v.
Gibson et al., 217 S. C. 500, 61 S. E. 2d 58 (1950).
36. Marshall v. Columbia & Eau Claire Electric Street Ry. Co., 73 S. C. 241,
53 S. E. 417 (1905).
[Vol. 6
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The trilogy of cases3 7 arising out of the sale of three lots, in refer-
ence to a plat containing an open space referred to as a park circle,
to a Mrs. Marshall, who subsequently claimed the right to have the
circle left undisturbed, show the change of the law in this state from
the general rule by which a platting of land and sale in reference
to the plat constitutes a completed dedication to the public of the
streets and alleys on the plat, to the view which regards such actions
as resulting only in an offer to dedicate. In 1897 the Eau Claire
Electric Street Railway Co. sold Mrs. Marshall three lots of land
in reference to a plat on which a circle of land adjoining her lots
was preserved for a park. Orally the president of the railway com-
pany assured Mrs. Marshall that the circle was dedicated by the
company to public uses and would be kept open for a park. In the
case of Marshall v. The Columbia & Eau Claire Electric Street Ry.
Co.,38 decided in 1905, the question of whether there had been a
dedication of the park, circle by the sale of the lots in reference to
the plat was raised. The court held that there was a dedication to
the public. In Diseker v. Eau Claire Land and Improvement Co.,39
decided in 1910, the court was again confronted with the same prob-
lem, arising out of the same set of facts, as was raised in the Williains
case, but avoided a change of stand on the question of dedication of
the circle. In 1925, the case of Safety Building & Loan Co. v. Lyles4°
came before the court. Confronted once more with the same question
arising out of the same set of facts, the court announced that the
sale in reference to the plat was not a dedication of the circle since
it was never accepted by the public or the Town of Eau Claire, the
town not even being in existence at the time of the sale of the lots.
In a recent case, Outlaw v. Moise,41 the court cleared up the law
on this subject, holding that a sale in reference to a plat showing
streets and alleys shows merely an intent to dedicate, and must be
accepted like any other common-law dedication to be complete.
Strictly speaking, there can be no dedication to private persons,
so it is improper to speak of a sale of lots in reference to a plat on
which streets appear as effecting a dedication as between a grantor
37. Marshall v. Columbia & Eau Claire Electric Street Ry. Co., 73 S. C. 241,
53 S. E. 417 (1905); Diseker v. Land & Improvement Co., 86 S. C. 282, 68
S. E. 529 (1910); Safety Building & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S. C. 542, 128
S. E. 724 (1925).
38. Marshall v. Columbia & Eau Claire Electric Street Ry. Co., supra
note 37.
39. Diseker v. Land & Improvement Co., 86 S. C. 241, 53 S. E. 417 (1905).
40. Safety Building & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S. C. 542, 128 S. E. 724 (1925).
41. 222 S. C. 24,71 S. E. 2d 509 (1952).
1953]
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and a grantee; yet this is often done.42 Whether the grantee by buy-
ing a lot in reference to a plat has a right of way in the streets and
alleys on the plat is actually entirely independent of any rights which
might exist in the public.
43
The rights of a grantee who purchases in reference to a plat are
so closely tied up with, and confused with the rights of the public,
however, as to justify treatment here.
Three views as to a grantee's rights have developed in the United
States: (1) the so-called "broad view" whereby the grantee gets an
easement in all streets designated in the plat;4 (2) another view is
that the grantee's rights are limited to the streets on which his land
abuts, so far as is necessary in order to reach a cross street in either
direction ;45 (3) still another view is that the grantee is not restricted
to such streets as border his lots, but that he acquires rights in all
ways as are reasonably necessary for access to and exit from his
lot.46  In the Safety Building & Loan Co. v. Lyles case, the court,
apparently wishing to end the litigation for once and fQr all, seized
upon a fourth theory of the grantee's rights, holding that when Mrs.
Marshall bought the lots with reference to the platted circle, she
received an easement in gross in the circle, which easement died
with her. This theory has never been further developed in the
South Carolina cases and seems to have no support elsewhere. In
a recent case47 the South Carolina court speaking through Justice
Stukes points out that in the Lyles case the successors of Mrs. Mar-
shall's interest in the lots were not included in the suit, and thus
the right originally acquired by her in the first suit was not defended;
this implies that had the rights acquired by Mrs. Marshall been
properly defended, the result may not have been a finding of an ease-
ment in gross.
The South Carolina court has never had to rule on the question
of whether a purchaser who buys in reference to a plat gets an ease-
ment in all the streets appearing on the plat, or only in those which
abut his property or only in those which are necessary. Twice re-
cently the court has held that where the owner sells in reference to
a plat, the buyer gets an easement in those streets which abut his
42. 11 McQuILLiN, op. cit. supra note 13, § 33.24.
43. 3 TI'FANY, op. cit. supra note 32, § 800.
44. Collins v. Land Co., 128 N. C. 563, 39 S. E. 21 (1901); Cook v. Totten,
49 W. Vir. 177, 38 S. E. 491 (1901).
.45. Reis v. City of New York, 188 N. Y. 58, 80 N. E. 573 (1907).
46. Schermerhorn v. Todd, 51 Mich. 21, 16 N. W. 304 (1883).
47. Cason v. Gibson et al., 217 S. C. 500, 61 S. E. 2d 58 (1950).
[Vol. 6
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property.48 While the court has not yet had occasion to rule in a
case in which the grantee claims an interest in all the streets con-
tained in a plat, there is reason to believe that the "broad rule" set
out above would prevail. In the case of The Town f Estill v. Clark,49
the court by way of dictum approved the "broad rule" as stated above.
Since this case the court has found three occasions to repeat this
dicta.5 0
Public Use As Showing Intent
Under certain circumstances an intent to dedicate may be inferred
from mere public user, unless the user is permissive only.51 If the
public user has been openly as of right, and for such a length of
time that the owner of the land must know of it, the owner's acquies-
cence may justify the inference that it was his intention to dedicate
the land to such use.52 If the user by the public is based on a license
or permission given to an individual or to a group of individuals,
and is not as of right, the owner's acqtuiescence therein can obviously
not support an inference of dedication.53 While it is impossible to
fix any specific length of time necessary to show a dedication, proof
of user by the public for a period much shorter than required to
show title by prescription may be sufficient to prove the intent to dedi-
cate.S4 In a recent case5 5 the South Carolina court held that the
length of time of the public user is of no material consequence in
showing an intent on the part of the owner of the land to dedicate
it to public use unless it becomes important in connection with other
circumstances. This is to be distinguished from a situation in which
public user is employed to show acceptance of a dedication by the
public. In such a case the length of time of the public user becomes
very material, it having been held that it must be a long-continued
use by the public as of right in order to constitute an acceptance of
the dedication.5 6 Also to be distinguished is the situation in which
a dedication is claimed by virtue of prescription or presumption of a
48. Cason v. Gibson et al., supra note 47; Billings et al. v. McDaniel, 217
S. C. 261, 60 S. R. 2d 592 (1950).
49. 179 S. C. 359, 184 S. E. 89 (1936).
50. Outlaw et al. v. Moise, 222 S. C. 24, 71 S. E. 2d 509 (1952); Cason v.
Gibson et al., 217 S. C. 500, 61 S. E. 2d 58 (1950); Billings et al. v. McDaniel,
217 S. C. 261, 60 S. E. 2d 592 (1950).
51. 11 McQuuaIN, op. cit. suepra note 13, § 33.31.
52. 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 32, § 1102.
53. Grady v. City of Greenville, 129 S. C. 89, 123 S. R. 494 (1924).
54. 11 McQumNrn, op. cit. supra note 13, § 33.33.
55. Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S. C. 342, 72 S. E. 2d 699 (1952).
56. Caston v. City of Rock Hill, 107 S. C. 124, 92 S. . 191 (1916).
1953]
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Dedication is a fairly young child of the common law, yet it has
grown by such leaps and bounds that it often. upsets its judicial
fathers. It is doubtful if the English judges who gave birth to this
doctrine, even in their most far-seeing moments, could have imagined
the doctrine growing to its present importance. Because of this rapid
growth there has been little time for precedents to become set. As
a natural result there is little uniformity among the courts on the
subject, and judges often confuse the doctrine with various types
of easements which have little connection with dedication.
As stated previously, two important problems arise in relation to
dedication. It is believed that the first of these problems has been
handled wisely by the South Carolina court. The court has reversed
itself and now holds that a sale of a lot in reference to a plat merely
evidences an intent to dedicate the streets appearing on the plat rather
than as accomplishing a complete dedication. Such a view protects
a vendor who, having visions of a vast residential area developing
on his land, sells one lot pursuant to a plat and then cannot rid him-
self of the others. If it were held that such a sale constituted a dedi-
cation, his land could be tied up forever, always subject to the public's
interest in the streets shown on the plat. Certainly the change of
view by the South Carolina court was desirable.
The second of these problems, the interest acquired by a vendee
in the streets shown on a plat in relation to which he buys a lot, has
yet to be settled in this state. As pointed out previously, three
views have been advanced in this country as to the interest which
the vendee acquires. The South Carolina court has favored the
"broad view". Perhaps the best opposition to this view is found
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in the North Carolina
case of Collins v. Asheville Land Co. :58
.. if a man owning two or three thousand acres of land, in
a moment of public craze, such as we have recently had, makes
a plat of it showing a hundred streets that have never had and
never will have any actual or potential existence outside of the
fertile imagination of a land boomer, and sells a sinigle quarter-
57. State v. Allen, 107 S. C. 132, 92 S. E. 193 (1916); Hutto v. Tindall
et al., 6 Rich. 396 (S. C. 1853).
58. 128 N. C. 563, 39 S. E. 20 (1901).
[Vol. 6
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acre lot to a man whom he happened to show the plat, he can
never dose a single one of the hundred paper streets; it makes no
difference that the lot sold is on the extreme corner of the plat,
and is not affected in value in the slightest degree by the open-
ing or closing of back streets miles away from it, and that its
purchaser has no use for the streets which can never be used
by him or anybody else for any practical purpose. In spite of
these facts, all these hundred streets must be kept open forever,
not to subserve his convenience, for they add nothing to that,
but simply to gratify his whim, or to enable him to force the
vendor to buy his piece at any price he may ask .... It may be
said that this is reductio ad absurdurm. Even so, it is the result
that may flow from the opinion of the court.
By ruling that a sale in reference to a plat was only evidence of
an intent to dedicate to the public the court has removed a great
hardship from the vendor. To hold that the vendee gets an ease-
ment in all the streets shown on the plat is to place the burden back
upon the vendor. An adoption of the "broad view" would therefore
be totally inconsistent with the present state of the law in South
Carolina. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the court will adopt one
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